Eric Suffert acutely describes the dangers of extending payback windows. At every t+1 the accuracy of LTV declines while the variance in cohort profitability increases. LTV, however, is not an exogenous variable and clever design can incentivize players into revealing their long-run time horizons within a game.
Consider the design of a many subscriptions: you can pay a lower annual fee or a higher month-to-month fee. If you’re uncertain about the subscription, then the month-to-month is more economical while if you have more certainty then the annual fee makes more sense. The choice is a huge predictor of retention: annual users are far more likely to retain then month-to-month users. The mere inclusion of this annual/month-to-month choice gives users the opportunity self-segment into more predictable cohorts. Why can’t we use the same mechanics in game design to create more predictable LTVs?
Consider two possible goods for purchase via gems in Clash of Clans: a builder or gold. The builder increases the long-run growth rate of gold while the gold itself is a temporary boost in short-run capital stock. In layman’s terms: spending 100 gems on a builder might net you 200 gold today and 1,000 gold by D30 while spending 100 gems directly on gold may only yield 700 Gold today and 0 gold by D30. The builder is an annuity that pays dividends every period, the longer a player’s time horizon the more valuable the annuity.
Players who expect to have a long time horizon in a given title have an enormous incentive to purchase “investment” goods or goods that pay dividends overtime (battle passes similar to some degree). Not doing so results in a increasing opportunity cost penalty every period due to lost compounding growth.
F2P has experimented with direct daily annuities of hard currency. They offer players a discount over the standard IAP packs but must pay upfront to receive a daily allowance. Instead of a 30-day pass, why not ramp to a quarterly or bi-annual pass? Doing so would make LTVs more predictable early in given player’s lifecycle.
The ASA has banned misleading ads from Playrix’s Gardenscapes. Running the same creative in user acquisition hits diminishing returns fairly quickly as the creative “clears the market” for users attracted to that creative. To broaden appeal, why not simply advertise the game as existing in a entirely different genre? This opens up a whole new segment and drops CPIs significantly. Of course, advertising gameplay that doesn’t exist surely means these users will exhibit extremely poor KPIs. However, there’s a broader implication to these ads and one that harms the entire game industry.
Where’s the garden? And the gems? What about the dog?
The harm is described in Akerlof’s Nobel Prize winning paper on car lemons:
Akerlof’s original example of the purchase of a used car noted that the potential buyer of a used car cannot easily ascertain the true value of the vehicle. Therefore, they may be willing to pay no more than an average price, which they perceive as somewhere between a bargain price and a premium price. Adopting such a stance may at first appear to offer the buyer some degree of financial protection from the risk of buying a lemon. Akerlof pointed out, however, that this stance actually favors the seller, since receiving an average price for a lemon would still be more than the seller could get if the buyer had the knowledge that the car was a lemon. Ironically, the lemons problem creates a disadvantage for the seller of a premium vehicle, since the potential buyer’s asymmetric information, and the resulting fear of getting stuck with a lemon, means that they are not willing to offer a premium price for a vehicle of superior value.
If users start to have an expectation that a given game ad does not truthly describe the game in question then they’ll be less likely to click. This means higher UA costs even if your firm does not engage in these type of ads.
A similar problem is starting to creep up in PvP games. Developers have started to be confronted with the uncomfortable reality that PvP is a zero-sum game: for someone to win, someone else has to lose. And of course, when players cannot progress they churn. Supercell has heavily introduced bots in Clash Royale as a response.
Of course, players cannot identify if they are indeed playing a bot or a real player. This steals one of the compelling aspects, if not the compelling aspect, of PvP away from players: outsmarting another individual. But like the lemon problem above, if this trend continues then players will start to question if they’ve dominated a real opponent even if the particular game doesn’t use bots. Games that use unmarked bots start an industry expectation that diminishes the experience for all.
There’s a good moral rule here to help us and it’s from an 18th century philosopher called Immanuel Kant. Kant advocates for something called the Categorical Imperative. This claims that if we were to universalize a given action and it would result in a “contradiction” then that action is immoral. Consider lying: if everyone were to lie then the world would not function, therefore lying is immoral. Or consider being lazy: if everyone were lazy then nothing would get done. It’s a no-holds-barred approach to consider moral action, but thankfully we’ll use it a much more narrow scope.
If unmarked bots were to be universalized, PvP games would be irrevocably harmed. If misleading ads were to be universalized, then players would stop clicking on them all together. Both of these situations violate the Categorical Imperative and align with outcomes that benefit the entire industry. The Categorical Imperative makes for a simple and rule based approach to consider the “greyer” parts of developer action.
There’s a compelling aspect to achieving group oriented goals: being apart of something larger than yourself. Lots of F2P developers harp on the importance of social features. Yet the social experience in many games is abysmal. Lots of teammates or clanmates don’t seem interested in participating instead preferring to “free-ride”, putting forward little effort but getting the fruits of the team reward. Mancur Olson’s foundational work, The Logic of Collective Action, describes how this problem manifests in the public sphere (sometimes literally in the case of electric scooters). Game designers have a much easier time aligning individual and clan incentives than public officials yet they sometimes miss easy wins. How can we make the clan experience better then it might otherwise be?
In Clash Royale, clans advance a boat against rival clans. Advancing the boat depends on individual clanmates playing games everyday (and winning). The more clanmates play consistently, the more the boat advances and the better the rewards the clan will receive. But for many clanmates playing everyday requires a great of effort, why not let others earn the rewards for you?
How do the boats move without oars? Supercell’s biggest mistake since Rush Wars.
The problem is severe in Battlefield where “PTFO” or “Play the Fucking Objective” is standard nomenclature. Players often won’t engage in activities that benefit the team (capturing flags), instead preferring to pursue their own objectives (generally: shoot players as fast as possible).
A given player faces two potential payoff schedules when considering to allocate effort to the clan. There’s the expected payoff with no effort (the probability that the clan/team will win if the given player did nothing) as well the probability that the clan will win if the player puts forth effort. We can model this as such:
is the probability of winning the clan event given give the effort of a given player or rather the additive probability of this given player participating.
While R is the reward from winning.
Of course if \(P(\mathit{winning}| \mathit{effort_i}) = P(\mathit{winning}) \) or the given player cannot sufficiently contribute to the probability of the clan winning then there’s zero incentive for them to put forth effort. Why bother?
This problem exacerbates as team size grows: the efficacy of a given player varies inversely with the number of teammates. This makes intuitive sense: in Battlefield, a player in 2 versus 2 match has a greater impact on the outcome then a player in a 32 versus 32 player match. The incentive to free-ride rises as the number of teammates or clanmates rises. Weakness hides in numbers.
We’ve also ignored the game-theory dynamics of this problem for simplicity, but it’s worth mentioning. If I know my other teammates are not going to put forth effort, why should I? This leads to Nash equilibriums where clans have almost no activity.
How can we overcome the free-rider problem and ensure that all teammates put forth effort? The highest cost-benefit feature is simply better monitoring tools. In many clan or team based games, clan leaders face asymmetric information: they simply can’t identify the players that do not put forth effort. A simple measure of activity (last login) or games played in the last week goes a long way to kicking out free-riders. We might also consider a joint-production function. In Battlefield or Clash Royale each player would receive a score based on their effort or contribution to team advancement, if the team wins they receive a multiplier on this score. Such a system would have two benefits: it would more closely align individual effort with individual outcome (reap what you sow), and it would increase the benefit for high performing clan members to engage in monitoring. For example, a high performing member might have $20 in contributions with a 2x multiplier or $40 for winning compared to a low performing member with $5 in contributions and therefore $10 for winning. In real terms, the high performing member has an even greater incentive to encourage low performers to put forth effort.
There’s a lot to be said for social shaming as well. While it hasn’t been effective for zero effort participants, there’s evidence it might help players on the margin. A push notification demonstrating that your clans needs you or perhaps better yet, a system where your clanmates can send you push notifications is a compelling way to push players into action.
Perhaps the greatest miss I see is not in clan monitoring (kicking out free-riders), but in self-selection to begin with. Clans are generally pareto efficient for players meaning that there’s zero cost and only benefit to joining one. Players then generally look for near max-size clans as they maximize the clan’s probability of winning a reward and thus the players. Reducing search costs by recommending (or restricting) clans based on device language, location, and some measure of progression maturity makes all players better off.
It’s hard for social monetization opportunities to take-off if team based activities suck. We still have a long way to go to fix top of the funnel problems. Afterall, teamwork makes the dreamwork.
The supply-side economics of subscriptions are fairly straightforward: get massive scale and distribute costs. Netflix has over 160M subscribers meaning a $100M production only costs each user $0.63. There’s zero marginal cost (unlike Spotify), so the more subscribers Netflix has the less a piece of content costs on a per user basis. At $11 per user per month, Netflix can spend over $1.7B on content each month and break even. In fact, as recently as 2019, Netflix does spend close to break even. In the long-run, Netflix has a incredible loop: content brings users, these users lower per user content costs, this accelerates more content spend, which brings more users. Rinse, wash, repeat until diminishing returns take hold.
But remember this wasn’t always the case. Content costs are fixed: the crew of Mindhunter doesn’t care how many subscribers Netflix has. They face costs unrelated to if 100M or 10M people watch the show. As early as 2010, Netflix only had 20M subscribers, suggesting a per user cost of $5 for a $100M production. There’s a gaping hole between $5 per user per $100M production and $0.96 per user per $100M production under their current 160M subscribers. This underscores the massive upfront investment needed for streaming to work on a supply-side basis.
It’s this exact reason Microsoft needs Playstation users for Game Pass to at least have a chance at buying down per user costs. It also explains their aggressive sub & console bundling as well as rock bottom introductory pricing.
Microsoft has disclosed Xbox Live has 90M MAU while Game Pass has 10M MAU. At $10 per user per month, Microsoft has can spend as much as $100M in content per month and break even. Development costs vary widely, but let’s start with assuming a conservative $70M per game. From a break even perspective, that’s around 17 games a year and consistent with Xbox Game Studios current production. That may sound like a lot, but the Xbox One has had over 2,500 games released in its lifecycle or about 350 games a year. Supporting this sort of volume is going to require a lot more users. A lot more.
Let’s have a little more fun with the cost side to get a better handle. Consider a simulation assuming anywhere from $30-$70M per game and anywhere from 100-350 games per year. We’ll randomly sample numbers in both ranges, multiplying them together to arrive at a per year content cost (ex: our simulation might pull $40M a game and 125 games for a yearly content cost of $5B. The density chart below represents 100,000 such pulls).
Simulating Content Costs of Game Pass
Based on this, Microsoft would most likely spend ~$7B per year to maintain similar volume. At $120 per user per year, this means 53M subscribers or about 5x the current amount to break even. At a 60% profit margin the number of subscribers jumps to 93M or more then the current Xbox Live MAU. Microsoft needs more users for this to work and they know it. Of course, perhaps this volume is insane and Microsoft wants much fewer but higher quality hits. In this case, however, the entire cost-savings model of subscriptions to the consumer declines. Our gaming subscription paradox re-emerges: subscriptions make increasing sense to the consumer wherein they would instead pay for many distinct pieces of content. Like music. Or T.V.
In many ways this explains the expansion of Game Pass to PC, Project xCloud, and the new Xbox console subscription bundle. Subscribers are capped by those with a console and Microsoft wants to start to unshackle that cap. Netflix recognized this long ago with Roku, Smart TVs, and apps on every platform or hardware they could find. The ability to sell Game Pass on iOS or Android explodes the addressable market, but is dependent on Azure wrangling the explosive unit costs of streaming. Hello Sony and the Playstation user base.
Amazon has announced Luna, yet another stab at game streaming and subscriptions. It seems like the failures of Apple Arcade, Stadia, Gamefly, and our oft-forgotten OnLive have not been effective deterrents. Not to be outdone, Rovio’s Hatch continues to drain money every quarter. Perhaps this is what Bezos warned shareholders about when discussing new “multibillion-dollar failures.”
And despite overwhelming failures, media pundits like Matthew Ball prop up skin-deep arguments in favor of game streaming and subscriptions. Instead of discussing why game streaming and subs might work, let’s talk about why they haven’t worked.
It’s important to understand the brother/sister relationship between streaming and subs. Subscriptions unlock zero-marginal cost content consumption. Once you’ve paid Netflix or Spotify $10, there’s $0 additional explicit cost to consume another movie or song. However, there are transactions cost. In the “before times,” customers had to mail DVDs back to Netflix to receive the next DVD in their queue. This effectively limited how much content customers could consume in a given month. If mailing took 3 days in transit, on a 1 DVD at-a-time plan, a customer could only consume 10 DVDs in a 30 day month. This assumes the customer turned around DVDs instantly. Furthermore, the “queue” forced customers to plan consumption habits rather than at the point of consumption. If you wanted Love Actually on Friday, but by Monday, you were in more of a Pretty Woman mood, then you’re shit out of luck. Let’s not forget that new releases were in strong demand, meaning it could be weeks before Transformers 3 lands in your mailbox. Steaming solved all this.
Non-steaming subs like Game Pass and EA Play exist in a weird middle, solving some but not all of these issues. Games are distributed digitally, but not instantly. A game like Call of Duty: Modern Warfare can take 3-4 hours to download on a 135 Mbps connection. SSD’s aren’t cheering at the prospect of 200GB games either. But once streaming takes off for games, these problems are solved. No storage is needed!
The incredible rise of free-to-play and GaaS (Games as a Service) render subs and streaming largely valueless to the player. Players do not consume games like TV or music, which should have been made obvious in the last decade. Players are playing fewer titles in a given year but are playing fewer titles for longer periods of time. Games solve the content problem in a way that other mediums simply can’t.
The content consumed in a game like Overwatch or Clash Royale is the pursuit of strategy equilibrium and/or mastery of mechanics. A new unit in Clash Royale, for instance, can change how players organize their decks, even if they don’t use the unit directly (they must counter it). This can provide hundreds of new hours of content to consume relative to the near 1 man-week of labor to produce a new unit. Therefore, the content output of a given member of the 16 person (!) Clash Royale team is astronomical. Compare this to the thousands of crew members and weeks necessary to produce even a single one-hour episode of Game of Thrones. Supply can’t keep pace with demand in the world of TV and movies. Netflix makes sense in this view because after binging 9 seasons of The Office, customers can immediately rip into 7 seasons of Star Trek: The Next Generation. It’s another reason why back catalogs are so much more important to Netflix than they are to something like Game Pass. If players are only investing in 3-4 new games a year, then the transactions cost reduction streaming is extremely minimal the benefit it provides in high unit consumption TV and music.
It’s a similar story for the failure of gaming subs. If players consume only 3-4 titles a year, subscriptions don’t make economic sense. Not to mention these 3-4 new titles are increasingly becoming free. In the West alone, League of Legends, Fortnite, Apex, Warzone, and Rocket League dominate playtime. And let’s not forget the entirely F2P ecosystem of mobile. The march to F2P in the West will continue as long as MTX revenues grow and box revenues shrink. There isn’t a whole lot to save by signing up for a $100 a year sub and streaming service when Fortnite doesn’t cost a dime.
Game streaming and subs don’t solve billion-dollar problems for the player. In the absence of doing so, subs and steaming will continue to flounder.
Like when you go to the airport for VAT refunds. Right?
Apple is increasingly under fire what’s claimed to be unfair practices in the App Store. The criticism takes three forms: (a) Apple’s 30% fee is much too high relative to cost (b) the rules are arbitrary and stifle competition and (c) the App Store as the exclusive avenue to install apps on iOS is unjust. That’s a lot to chew, so let’s focus on (a) for this post.
Eric Seufert’s criminally underrated podcast talks about this very topic but phrases the question as “Does Apple earn it’s 30%?” Various App Store benefits like payment handling and preventing fraud are discussed, but I wanted to scream by far and away the biggest way Apple “earns” it’s 30%: acquiring a mega fuck-ton users to iOS. Nearly the entire value of a platform to a developer is how many people it can reach. No one is rushing to get on Epic Game Store (EGS) or develop for Stadia because there are so few users. 12% or even a 0% fee is irrelevant: [88% * 0 users] = $0 versus [70% * more then zero users] = more then zero. This is an extreme example, but users are by far and away the most important ingredient of any platform. After all, developers can list in multiple stores with maintaining the listing or code for the particular platform as the only cost to do so. The fact that so few are willing to take on these small costs tells us a great deal about the user bases of Stadia and EGS.
But platforms fees also increase the LTV of the devices who run on the platform, if and only if, the firm internalizes those platform fees. For instance, the added platform LTV of an Android phone in China is less than in the United States because Chinese users install non-Google owned stores. In this case, platform fee revenue doesn’t accrue to Google.
If LTV of the iPhone X is say $1000, Apple should spend up to $1000 in UA to acquire a user. However, with platform fees the LTV grows. Sensor Tower estimates that iPhone users spend over $79 per year on apps. On a lifetime basis, that’s probably north of $250 (3+ years of ownership). That ups the iPhone’s LTV to $1250 and unlocks more UA budget for Apple to acquire more users. These marginal users benefit all developers. This is how Apple (or almost any platform holder) gives developers a rebate on the 30%. I’m not sure what the true fee is but it must be lower than 30%.
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